Why you got the Brotherhood wrong

“Just how scared should we be of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood? In numerical terms, it doesn't present much of a threat. Membership is in the low hundreds of thousands, and in a fair election, the Islamists would not be expected to win - in 2005, only 3% of the population voted for the Brotherhood.” Thus read a piece on Time magazine in November 2010, just two months before the start of the revolution that would topple Mubarak and, indeed, bring the Muslim Brotherhood to power. 

“The Muslim Brotherhood is a religiously conservative group. They are a minority in Egypt. They are not a majority of the Egyptian people, but they have a lot of credibility because of liberal parties have been a struggle for thirty years. They are in favor of a secular state. they are of –they are in favor of an institution that have bread lines, they are in favor that every Egyptian have the same rights, that the state is in no way a state based on religion. And I have been reaching out to them.” (sic) Words of El Baradei, as published on the 30th of January 2011, as protests were ongoing in Tahrir Square and elsewhere in Egypt.

 “There is no real danger that the revolution will be just the opening that Islamists need to take control.” And “Now there seems to be a concern that if President Hosni Mubarak leaves too soon, chaos will ensue and the Muslim Brotherhood could emerge as the biggest winner. But Egypt’s state structure is strong enough to withstand Mubarak’s ouster and there is no reason to think the protests will turn violent again.” Amr Hamzawi said on the 10^th of February, 2011, one day prior to the announcement by then vice-president Omar Suleiman that Mubarak has decided to step down.

Source: http://www.enumclaw.com/wp-content/uploads/Muslim-Brotherhood.jpg

Many have only recently started to realize how wrong they were when they supported the Muslim Brotherhood, hailing them as leaders on the forefront of a transition to democracy. Many analysts underestimated the group’s power and popularity, most importantly, they belittled any fears and worries about their threat. While many remain wary of loudly saying ‘mea culpa’, things in post-revolutionary Egypt have already revealed a lot. The Brotherhood’s undemocratic and illiberal practices are now being highlighted more than ever.

In this context, an honest discussion is needed in order to understand how and why so many got the Muslim Brotherhood wrong. It is useful to take a step back and consider how the group managed to use events to its advantage, convincing many that it was the right choice for those who believed in the stated goals of the Egyptian revolution. If anything is to be gained from Egypt’s failed democratic experiment, it should be an awareness of how an organization such as the Brotherhood was able to project an image of itself that later turned out to be a mere mirage. The goal is to avoid such public displays of deception from succeeding in the future.

There are two sides to the story. On the one hand, the Muslim Brotherhood has been able to fool both fellow countrymen as well as foreign analysts and politicians with talk about its plans for tolerance and inclusion. On the other hand, Western analysts have often thought and written about Egypt in such a fundamentally flawed way, that they themselves were particularly susceptible to being misled.  

I shall discuss a few aspects of the Muslim Brotherhood’s strategy while also highlighting why it succeeded and why it was often received with such naiveté.

Firstly, the Muslim Brotherhood have a media team focused on its communications to the outside world. Apart from its famous Twitter account @Ikhwanweb, the Brotherhood also has a website in English which, contrary to what some might think, doesn’t simply contain translations of what the Brotherhood’s Arabic-language platform has to offer, but a tailored array of articles aimed to project a certain image to the Western reader. A couple of Twitter users, aware of the misleading nature of this arrangement, have recently started a new website in which they translate the actual Arabic content from official Muslim Brotherhood online outlets. That website is full of anti-semitic, sectarian rhetoric as well as a wide array of outlandish conspiracy theories.

The problem here is not simply that some analysts were ‘lost in translation’. People like Sondos Assem and Gehad El-Haddad, who is also the executive director of the Brotherhood’s “Renaissance” project, are supposed to represent a different kind of Muslim Brotherhood. As journalist Nick Kristof said in December 2011: “First, meet my hostess: Sondos Asem, a 24-year-old woman who is pretty much the opposite of the stereotypical bearded Brotherhood activist. Sondos is a middle-class graduate of the American University in Cairo [...].  She speaks perfect English, is writing a master’s thesis on social media, and helps run the Brotherhood’s English-language Twitter feed, @Ikhwanweb.”

This export brand of Muslim Brothers (or Sisters in this case) is meant to instate the idea of the presence of a young, progressive, open-minded stream within the Brotherhood. This idea has also been espoused by many within Egypt itself, but the reality is that the older, traditional Brotherhood members are the ones who run the show. Furthermore, it is questionable to even state that the younger generation is more open-minded. Dissidents who fall out of line too much can only seek their refuge in leaving the organization as opposed to ‘changing it from within’. This has happened with numerous young members of the organization as well as with one of its leaders, Abul Fotouh, who left to contend in the presidential race.

The faces of the revolution as they appeared in most media outlets, were young, tech-savvy activists who were quite progressive and ‘West-friendly’. The aforementioned image of younger Brotherhood members fit that narrative. All these progressive, young Egyptians, no matter their political background, would supposedly shed the bonds of patriarchy and embrace modernity and help Egypt embrace democracy in the process. That is ultimately what many wanted to believe and the Brotherhood simply catered to that wishful thinking.

Secondly, it is obvious how the Brotherhood depended on the naiveté and lack of political experience of its opponents to sway public opinion in its favour. In 2011, after the fall of Mubarak, parliamentary elections were held which resulted in an overwhelming victory for Islamists. Calling any opposition to the latter “elitist” or “in contempt of (the will of) the people” or “islamophobic” became normal and widespread and was sadly condoned, both explicitly and implicitly by Egypt watchers under the guise of political correctness.

During and after Egypt’s first post-revolutionary presidential elections, one of the strongest weapons used by the Brotherhood was the word “felool” (remnant of the old regime). Slowly but surely the word infiltrated all political discussions, lost its original meaning and was used to discredit all opponents of the Brotherhood. In the run-off round, accusations of being pro-Mubarak and “slaves of the (military) boots” were hurled at anyone who dared not support the Brotherhood candidate. Play on emotions was widely used as those voting for Shafik were said to be signing their ballots with the “blood of martyrs” and committing high treason against the revolution and the country.

But of course, as it would become clear later on, those who voted for Shafik did so for many different reasons and they weren’t all sympathetic to the Mubarak regime, let alone actual members of its network. It was the belief that it was Shafik – and not Morsi – who was the “lessor of the two evils” that played an important role in many voters’ decisions. Many had in fact predicted a lot of what the Brotherhood ended up doing once it came to power and it turns out they chose Shafik for very legitimate reasons after all. Yet all those valid concerns were successfully discredited by the Muslim Brotherhood and as usual most people took the bait.

When the theory that SCAF would define the outcome of the presidential elections by rigging them in favour of Shafik was proven to be utter nonsense, a new distraction was sought. And so the theory of the “deep state” as propagated by the Brotherhood started gaining momentum. According to that viewpoint, the old regime was still in control of the state through a presence in its institutions which it used to systematically fight the revolution personified in president Morsi. This theory served as a scapegoat which helped the Muslim Brotherhood escape responsibility for its failure to make political or economic progress. It also became used as dangerous justification for any of the president’s illegitimate decisions such as the constitutional declaration issued in November 2012 and the consequent presidential appointment of a new public prosecutor.

Thridly, the Brotherhood’s choice to help perpetuate the revolutionary – “felool” paradigm was one of its best strategies. The revolutionary group in Egypt, which includes the Muslim Bortherhood itself, is a very diverse one, with no unified ideology. Muslim Brotherhood, clear proponents of a religious state were able to bypass many revolutionaries’ rejection of such a state precisely because of that. When it comes to actually governing a country, there was no “revolutionary” way. After Mubarak fell, the differences between revolutionaries came to light. Instead of the revolutionary – felool dichotomy, alliances should have been formed based on the kind of state each group wanted, based on ideology instead of slogans. In that process, those who were against the revolution or those who were part of the NDP for various reasons (without being implicated in any criminal activities) should have been involved.

Finally, it is not acceptable for those claiming to fight orientalism, neo-colonialism, Islamophobia and racism to stifle criticism of the Brotherhood in the name of cultural relativism while ignoring the organization’s blatant disregard for human rights and the rule of law. You got the Brotherhood wrong because you allowed considerations of political correctness to make you ignore the facts. You got the Brotherhood wrong when you chose to see the world through the paradigms they propagated, ignoring the complexity of the political situation. You got the Brotherhood wrong when you agreed that their “illiberal democracy” is still a democracy worth supporting.

Egypt's President: Tweeting an Offline Nation | Atlantic Council

Egypt's President: Tweeting an Offline Nation | Atlantic Council

The first rule of sectarianism

Reports ranged from "Mob of angry Copts are at the cathedral protesting against the Pope (while a funeral was going on, nota bene)." to "The church is to blame for the crisis, after all, they dared to have a funeral at the cathedral." to "Christians used their guns, conveniently stored in the cathedral, to fire at MOI." to "The church planned this out to be a civil war". 

There are typically four stages to a full-on sectarian crisis in Egypt. First, you have the long, hard, arduous work of actually spreading sectarian venom in society. Luckily, there is no shortage of people willing to take that noble task upon themselves. Whether it is the ruling Muslim Brotherhood or one of its offshoots, or your random, friendly, neighborhood (TV-)preacher or your regular public figure, even a presidential candidate (dubbed "moderate Islamist" by the never-naive mainstream Western media), hate speech has become common. 

There is a constant flow of rumors about the Coptic 'state-within-a-state' and the alleged vast amount of weapons stored within the churches. These rumors are not only unsubstantiated, but the ones which qualify as clear & direct incitement to the use of violence are almost never condemned, let alone punished by authorities. The Egyptian mind has often proven fertile ground for conspiracy theories. Not only Copts, but all other minorities, whether Baha'i, Shia or atheist are sometimes considered agents for foreign powers out to stifle Egypt's mindblowing democratic/economic progress. 

Photo of the attack on the Coptic Cathedral - via Ahram Online

Anyhow, after the successful spread of such rhetoric, the second stage of a sectarian crisis can begin. All it needs is a little spark, nothing big: a girl and a boy who happen to be from different religious backgrounds are rumored to be in love, a fight between two merchants, a Facebook status update, a scribble on a wall etc. Anything really is enough to be construed as proof for those who believe the Copts are out to destroy the Egyptian state with weapons stored in their churches (apparently, a meager 10% of the population with a history of sectarian violence are very likely to be plotting something like that). 

So what happens? Random mob violence is what usually happens, and collective punishment of entire communities. A small group might start the violence, but then people join in, fired up by chants and calls (or media reports) which echo in the streets as shops are set on fire, houses are looted and people are literally forced to flee for their lives. Usually there are a few dead here and there. That's pretty much it really. 

The majority of people who are involved in these attacks are arguably not paid to do so, nor ordered to so by some political figure. They are people whose minds are saturated enough with that venomous broth which has been slowly simmering in society for a long time. It is not Mubarak or Morsi who order these attacks, as some like to believe. Yes, they bear some responsibility for either leaving criminals unpunished or actively promoting sectarianism, but the fact of the matter is that sectarianism is well-founded in society so it doesn't need a top-down approach. 

So the violence happens, the third stage can commence. No sectarianism without victim-blaming. The circle is full when the incendiary rhetoric that was used in stage one is repeated again, this time to justify the violence or to claim it was the Copts themselves who are at fault (or whichever community is attacked). 

When it comes to media, one important factor in stage three is reporting about the facts as "clashes" instead of attacks. Because it just sounds better or is more politically correct, or because journalists choose to ignore facts or not do their jobs. In the end, the facts are misrepresented as clashes between two equally responsible sides. This theory can be supported if one assumes people having a funeral (of victims of another sectarian incident, nota bene) in a cathedral is somehow an attack warranting a counter-attack with various weapons. 

Finally, the fourth and most important stage of any sectarian crisis commences. It is the part in which a lovely state representative with a wide smile tells us there is no sectarianism in Egypt. He then recounts stories from his youth in which he used to have a Muslim/Christian neighbor with whom he used to play in the street, or alternatively, depending on the level of apparent tolerance needed, in whose house he used to eat during feasts and special occasions.

The first rule of sectarianism: you do not talk about sectarianism. 

A Renaissance gone bad

Once upon a time far away in that mystical place called the Orient, there was a Kingdom in distress. So three Musketeers set out to save the land. One used to be a hero in his youth, many lifetimes ago, troubadours once roamed the land singing tales of his bravery. The second was known as the stuttering star.. in the West. His encounters with the powerful forces of the East couldn't prepare him for what he would meet in the Kingdom of Pharaohs. Long ago, he had worked with the Dark Lords (before they shed their white cloaks) thinking they were on his side, but they eventually turned on him. The third of the Musketeers was of the plebs, but he had one gift, his magical hair wooed the public, that special way he liked to comb it to the left made all the young maidens go wild.

The three Musketeers weren’t always so close, but once the Dark Lords rose to power, they decided to form a union in order to defeat them. Many were not pleased with this union of interests: Greybeard was one of them even though there was a time when he thought of joining in.It didn’t work out well in the end, partly because “The Four Musketeers” just doesn’t have a ring to it.

But that wasn’t the only reason, Greybeard had once been one of the elders in the Council of the Dark Lords, he had sworn an oath of fealty to the Supreme Lord of Darkness, a bond not easily broken. When Greybeard decided to disobey his Lord, he was banished from the pack, cursed to always roam the land, to be everything and nothing all at once. Not black nor white, but always in between, that was Greybeard’s place.

The Younglings were of little stature but with hearts of gold. They followed the tales of the three Musketeers closely, first with joy, but later with growing resentment and disappointment. It became clear the Musketeers were no match to the Dark Lords who had gold and could always count on the support of the Elephant Prince who lived in a far away land. The Dark Lords lived in a big castle on Mount Doom but always maintained close contact to their allies abroad.

The whole story started when the Younglings challenged the Fat King who had ruled the land for many many years. The Fat King was loved once, but as he grew older, his hearing weakened and so did his eyesight. After a long ride, he couldn’t land softly anymore.

When the Dark Lords felt his time had come, they joined the Younglings in their quest for power. The Dark Lords had been dreaming about this for a long time and it would become their first step to world-dominion. Once the Fat King fell, the true nature of the Dark Lords was revealed and they took off their white cloaks. In order to keep the Younglings on their side, they devised an evil scheme. They brewed a yellowy potion and gave it to the naïve Younglings who drank it joyously. The drink tasted good in the beginning, but as with many things in this story, later turned out to be an acidic poison.

And thus everyone waged battles against everyone in a war of all against all in the Kingdom of Pharaohs. Plagues hit the land and locusts left green fields behind as barren places of despair. Even in Mount Doom, confidence and arrogance had made way for discord and frustration. The Heir to the Supreme Head of the Council of Darkness was unhappy that his brother, the Spare, had become King. The Mad King, as he became known, felt unappreciated and unwanted. He had grown up jealous of his brother and thought becoming King would make up for his lost childhood. He used to threaten his subjects with things which cannot be named in a fairy tale such as this, suffice it to say that his threats only brought more misery upon him and his people and they lived happily never after.

Everything is relative

It is time analysts and commentators lay off and stop criticizing Arabs for not being 'democratic', 'liberal' or 'human rightsy' enough. The truth of the matter is that Arabs aren't made for the whole democracy thing nor do they care for so-called human rights. In fact, polls suggest that dictatorship comes natural to Arabs and runs in their veins together with the unnaturally high amounts of tea they consume while sitting outside in the afternoons discussing Arab-stuff.

It is also time we are honest about those, from the West or from within the Arab world itself, who engage in public condemnation of actions committed by Arab rulers to protect society from foreign influences. These people are either paid agents or self-loathing Arabs who don't understand or appreciate their culture.

Let's discuss the case of the statement issued by the Muslim Brotherhood regarding the discussions recently held in the UN Commission on the Status of Women. The Muslim Brotherhood, being the only true representatives of the Arab people, as polls suggest, epitomize universally held values in the Arab world. Their rejection of the possibility of marital rape is but a reflection of what Arab and Muslim identity really stand for. We must trust that this is only in the interest of protecting society from "complete disintegration" as they say in their statement.

As the wise Protagoras said back in the 5th century BC (that is before all Western analysts became hell bent on destroying Arab identity) "Everything is relative". We must remember that like freedom of speech and freedom of religion, the right to physical integrity is also a mere Western construct that is not necessarily fit for Arab consumption. When the Muslim Brotherhood sees it fit to legalize FGM (female genital mutilation) or allow child marriages, it is an act of courageous rebellion against Western intervention. Things like police torture and trials of consciousness for atheists are absolutely normal in an Arab context, even if they're frowned upon elsewhere.

To the Western reader, I say, you must understand that democracy and Arabs don't mix. It is an achievement already that they were able to resort to the ballots, requiring them to fulfill the other complex requirements of a fair democratic process is asking too much. Arabs love dictators and hate democracy and this is why they are restoring dictatorships after they fell during the Arab Spring revolts. It was wrong to condemn the rulers then as it is wrong to condemn them now for simply trying to protect their societies. If the so-called human rights of individuals have to be sacrificed for the sake of the collective, then that is their prerogative.

And to those Arabs who advocate for human rights, I say that they must review their position. They must realize that they are tools in the hands of those who want "the intellectual and cultural invasion of Muslim countries, eliminating the moral specificity that helps preserve cohesion of Islamic societies" as the Muslim Brotherhood warns. 



Disclaimer: Just in case it wasn't clear: this is a parody of moral relativists and their dangerous views on the Arab world.

Perverse Paternalism

Recently, the American administration decided it wouldn’t give Samira Ibrahim the “Woman of Courage” award she was supposed to get. The reason for the change of heart was a series of tweets which demonstrated hatred, intolerance and dangerously ignorant thinking. This has caused much controversy and stirred up a lot of debate that deserves some analysis.

Samira appeared in the spotlights last year when she claimed she had been subjected to so-called “Virginity Tests” by the army. In a society where victims of sexual harassment are often blamed for the abuse they had to endure, it takes a lot of nerve to stand up and admit one has been the victim of such harassment. Furthermore, Samira’s case wasn’t just against anybody, it was against the institution which was then still in charge of the country. With over 100.000 Twitter followers, Samira is now a public figure whose case drew a lot of media attention both domestically and internationally.

In her tweets, Samira had wished for America to burn and this on the anniversary of 9/11. Furthermore, she expressed her joy at a terrorist attack which killed several (Israeli – does that matter?) civilians in Bulgaria. She also positively quoted Hitler as saying that the Jews are behind all the world’s problems. With regards to the anti-Islam film which has caused a lot of anger when it appeared last year, she said that the diaspora Copts are not the only ones to blame, but the entire West.

My aim is to discuss the responses to Samira’s tweets and the reactions they got. According to some, Samira was wrong in saying what she said, but shouldn’t have been deprived of the award regardless of that fact. In their view, the award was supposed to be for her courage in her ordeal with the army and shouldn’t be dependent on views she expressed in public. Ironically, Samira’s first reaction after people became aware of her tweets was to claim that her account had been hacked and that all racist or hateful tweets weren’t hers. Courage, as apparently some don’t know, is also about taking responsibility for one’s opinions and admitting the mistakes one makes. When it was clear she wouldn’t be getting any award, Samira made the claim that she had been pressured to apologize to the Zionist lobby for her tweets, claiming the Zionist lobby was the only problem. According to that theory, the U.S. would have gladly and readily rewarded a woman who wished for them to burn if only the “Zionist Lobby” hadn’t intervened.

The next important response is the one in which it is claimed that her statements should be put in context. The argument goes that since many Arabs use that kind of rhetoric, what Samira did “isn’t really that bad”. This reasoning is flawed on many levels. Firstly, there is the assumption that this kind of anti-Western, anti-Jewish, anti-Coptic rhetoric is a natural thing to Arabs and therefore excusable in some way. It’s as if the proponents of this view believe that "Arabs just can’t help it". Needless to say, those who adhere to this idea insult Arab individuals in a very profound way. Secondly, the pseudo-logic of justifying a mistake “because someone else did it” might be expected of children aged 5-7, but surely not of anyone who wishes to be taken seriously in a grown-up world.

Finally, some people rushed to the defence of Samira Ibrahim claiming she is a poor, uneducated girl who simply didn’t know better. Apparently, one needs to go to Harvard to learn that reveling in the death of innocent civilians is wrong. Also clear from this reasoning is the very nasty habit which many (mostly leftist) pundits have adopted in which poverty is used to justify unacceptable behaviour. Again, in the assumption that “poor people just can’t help being bigoted, intolerant and inhumane individuals”. Surprisingly (well, not really) those who claim to defend the interests of the poor by speaking on their behalf, are insulting them in a very paternalistic way.

The fact of the matter is that what Samira Ibrahim did was wrong. And it was possibly even worse to deny it and then claim hero-status for having supposedly resisted immense pressure from the Zionist lobby (nota bene: the tweets mentioned above weren't about Israel or Zionism at all). Thankfully many activists loudly denounced what she did, but there remains a large portion which believes defending such behavior can somehow be beneficial. The reality is that it will only perpetuate the problem. We need harsh self-criticism and strong principles in the realization that we won’t move forward unless we start taking responsibility and demanding that others bear the consequences of their actions as well.

You can read more about the facts of the story here

Thatcher refuses to jump

I recently came across this video of an interview with former British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher. In the context of the interview, guests are apparently asked to do something out of the ordinary, namely to jump up in the air. When the interviewer asks Thatcher to do this, she refuses and says the following: "I see no significance whatsoever of making a jump up in the air, I made great leaps forward, not little jumps in studios." 

Now, this video might be viewed as humorous by some, but what struck me in the quote I mentioned above is the simple wisdom contained in it. Thatcher contrasts jumping up and down with moving forward, in both cases there is movement, both are dynamic expressions but only one involves actual change in position.

This got me thinking about the Arab World and the aftermath of the uprisings that swept through the region in the course of the past two years. I wrote before about the mistake of insisting on a united revolutionary front which deludes the meaning of the revolution for the different groups and individuals who participated in it for different reasons and with different goals in sight. A lot of what has been happening by insisting on something which isn't possible in reality like that artificial unity is that people have been protesting, getting their hopes up and trying in vain, they have been jumping up and down. They are active, they feel they are doing something when in reality they haven't moved forward a bit.

In reality not much has changed in Egypt, in fact, things have gotten worse on many levels, and I think the problem is that so much energy and so much potential go to waste by insisting on using the same methods which have proven ineffective so many times in the past. It might be more exciting to jump up, to feel the euphoria of being detached from the ground, from reality, for just a little while. But when you come down again after jumping, you find you are still in the same place and the energy you used making that jump will have gone to waste.

Instead, it might be worth considering trying different methods to move forward, even if the steps are small and the process is slow. It might not be as invigorating, but it is most probably more consistent and will, in the long run, yield better results.

The interviewer, trying to convince Thatcher to do what even Gorbachev did, told Thatcher that her jumping up and down might be a chance to show people that she is actually doing something, not just talking. Thatcher answers saying that she wouldn't jump in a studio during an interview to please an audience, but is intent upon gaining and preserving their respect for her by working on the ground. There are different kinds of actions, some more appealing to those who seek entertainment and excitement, others less visible but perhaps much more valuable and lasting. We have been criticizing the political elite in Egypt, we see them daily on television, but when we look in reality they are nowhere to be found and their influence nowhere to be felt. It might be useful to reflect upon Thatcher's response when put in the situation she was put in.